Tuesday, May 27, 2008

Velleman's Sorrow of Options

In most liberal moral philosophies, freedoms, rights, and choices are accorded high value, whether or not rights are seen to be important only to the extent that they promote overall welfare. Sometimes, however, it is argued that rights should be curtailed because agents may make "wrong" choices if given certain rights. For instance, if people have a right to eat fatty foods, they may irrationally choose to over-indulge, causing themselves harm, because they lack the cognitive ability to make the "correct" decision that does not harm them. To the extent that the right is removed to benefit the agent, rather than to benefit others he might harm (such as the public health system), this is known as paternalism. Paternalism substitutes the state's decision for that of the actor, presumably on the grounds that the actor lacks the ability to make the decision that will best promote his goals. Paternalism obtains when there is a fear that the actor will choose wrongly.

In contrast to this, J. David Velleman, in "Against the Right to Die," presents an admirable non-paternalistic argument about how being given a choice may harm an agent - that is, that merely having a choice may harm an agent, even if he is perfectly rational and makes the "correct" decision one hundred percent of the time. Velleman takes an example from the world of negotiation from Thomas Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict:
. . . having an option can be harmful even if we do not exercise it and - more surprisingly - even if we exercise it an gain by doing so . . . . The union leader who cannot persuiade his membersship (sic) to approve a pay-cut, or the ambassador who cannot contact his head-of-state for a change of brief, negotiates from a position of strength; whereas the negotiator for whom all concessions are possible deals from weakness. If the rank-and-file give their leader the option of offering a pay-cut, then management may not settle for anything less, whereas they might have settled for less if he hadn't had the option of making the offer. The union leader will then have to decide whether to take the option and reach an agreement or to leave the option and call a strike. But no matter which of these outcomes would make him better off, choosing it will still leave him worse off than he woudl have been if he had never had the option at all.

Velleman relates another option from Ronald Dworkin's paper, "Is more choice better than less?": a night cashier in a convenience store is made worse off by the option to open the safe, because his having this option makes him an attractive target for robbers. Once robbed, he's better off opening the safe, but overall, he'd certainly be much better off - less likely to be robbed in the first place - if he didn't have the option to open the safe!

Velleman also discusses a dinner party invitation as a potentially harmful choice. Given an invitation, I may refuse or accept, but I am denied the option of simply not going without answering - I have to either accept or hurt the host's feelings, and even if I "correctly" chose the best option of those two, I might be yet better off having never been offered the invitation.

Velleman's target, obviously, is assisted suicide in cases of severe disability or terminal illness. A terminally ill person without the right to die has, in a sense, the "right to live" - and need not justify his "exercise" of that right to anyone. He simply lives, and hasn't the option to die. However, given a right to die, there is a sense in which he loses the right to live without explicitly choosing to do so. People in this scenario (and Velleman is only talking about the terminally ill and the severely impaired, so his argument does not apply to ordinary suicides) frequently depend on others to care for them, and may be concerned about imposing a burden on others by living. This burden can only be said to be imposed by the ill person if he has some choice not to impose it - that is, a choice to die. The ill person may be best off with no choice, continuing to live and be cared for by others. But given the choice between imposing a burden on others and taking his life, he may rationally choose to die, though he would have preferred not to have the choice at all. Velleman notes that not only the burden of care, but also the exhaustion of the ill person's assets (which may be expected to pass to his heirs on his death) may be considered, rationally, by the ill person in deciding whether to die. In the situation where an ill person enjoys living and wishes to live, but not so much that he would impose a burden on his family, the right to die makes him worse off, even if he makes a rational decision once the right is offered. "I am arguing that we must not harm others by giving them choices," says Velleman, "not that we must withhold the choices from them lest they harm themselves."

While Velleman elicudates a valid and real concern for some terminally ill or severely disabled people, even Velleman himself recognizes that the argument should not prevent assisted suicide in all cases. His proposed solution is to do nothing, and leave the current system in place, where there is no institutional right to die, but some suffering people may still (illegally) be offered euthanasia at their doctor's discretion. (Velleman does not address the social injustice of allowing this service to be offered only to those with a relationship with a doctor, that is, wealthy people.) Velleman also founds his argument on a Kantian belief that it is immoral to commit suicide, which I obviously reject. He says:

. . . if I believed that people had a moral right to end their lives, I would not entertain consequentialist arguments against protecting that right. But I don't believe in such a moral right . . .

My interest in Velleman's argument - the sorrow of choice - is that it applies in unexpected ways and in unexpected places, depending on where one puts the initial assessment of value.

Now that I've explained the argument in detail, I'm going to put in in a shorter outline form, so we can see how the moving parts work, and apply it to new problems. I'm going to be putting things in what might sound like flippant language - I do this in the interest of clarity, and not in any way to disparage Velleman, who is like a god to me.

  • The right to live is morally important, and the right to die is not.
  • Given the right to die, people who are a burden on their caretakers might choose to die rather than be a burden, even if what they really wanted was to live without having to explicitly choose to live.
  • Therefore, the freedom to die harms the person.
  • It's wrong to harm people, even to harm them by giving them choices.
  • No right to die.

An interesting feature of this argument, which I alluded to in my previous post on life rights and death rights, is that, given different starting conditions, it might act as an argument against a right to live.

Some people, of course - I put myself on this list - would prefer to die, but might not wish to explicitly choose death. Given that we are stuck with a "choice" to live, many of us continue to live, miserably, rather than bear the responsibility for the harm our deaths may cause. We are certainly harmed by having the option to continue living; we wish that we might die or be killed in our sleep, but we are denied our best option by a "right" to continue to live. If we started with the assumption that the right to die was more important than the right to live in many circumstances, the sorrow of choice would act in favor of euthanasia - even without consent.

This argument - and I don't mean it either as a reductio or as a serious statement of my position - goes like this:

  • The right to die is important, more so than the right to live.
  • Given the right to survive (on a respirator, say), people who wish to die will suddenly bear responsibility for choosing death, and may choose to go on suffering in life instead, even though they'd prefer to die, all things considered.
  • Therefore, the suffering person is harmed by the choice to remain alive.
  • It's wrong to harm people, even by giving them choices.
  • Euthanasia for everyone.

Although Velleman says he doesn't recognize a moral right to die, he indicates that as part of his consequentialist "sorrow of choice" project that he'd be happiest to distinguish between those who would be harmed by the right to die, and those who wouldn't be harmed, and offer the choice only to those who wouldn't be harmed by it. (Velleman would leave this discretion in the hands of doctors, who would be acting illegally in the cases in which they offered assisted suicide.) If choice is such an important harm, and can be a harm in either direction, perhaps it would be best to try to distinguish between four groups: (1) those who would be harmed by having the option to die; (2) those who wouldn't be harmed by the option to die; (3) those who would be harmed by the option to live; and (4) those who wouldn't be harmed by the option to live. Group (1) will be forced to remain alive; group (3) will be euthanized without consent; and groups (2) and (4) will be offered appropriate options. (Again, I don't mean this as a reductio, exactly, nor as a statement of my true thinking - with this argument, just now, we must think of ourselves as playing with philosophical tinker toys, free to see how they might fit together. If it has any purpose other than exploration, this paper is intended as a check on being too sure of our intuitions. Non-suicidal intuitions have been allowed to define the conversation for far too long.)

The sorrow-of-choice argument may be fruitfully applied - in a less shocking manner - to pronatalist and antinatalist concerns. In the antinatalist camp, we might see being brought into existence itself as the harmful choice that is forced upon a person to his detriment. Being brought into existence forces all kinds of choices onto a person - not the least of which is the choice to remain alive. If a person would be best off never having existed - and this is certainly true of many people, even if we don't admit Benatar's central claim that it applies to everyone - then bringing him into existence, and offering him choices, even the best of which make him worse off than before he was born, is a harm. The argument would look like this:

  • The interest in not existing is important; the interest in coming into existence is minor compared to it.
  • After having come into existence, some people will be worse off, even if they make every decision perfectly, than if they had not been offered choices by being brought into existence.
  • It is wrong to harm people, even by giving them choices.
  • It's wrong to have babies.

The harm can be either to the being brought into existence, or to the potential parents. The argument, applied to the interests of potential parents, works either to support outlawing contraception and abortion, or to support outlawing procreation, depending on which is seen as having the greater force as a moral right. Just to sketch out what the arguments would look like in each case:

  • Procreation is an important right, compared to the right not to procreate.
  • The choice not to procreate forces people to justify their reproductive decisions; they may prefer to have ten children without explicitly choosing to do so, but given the choice, opt to have none or to have only two, rather than burden society.
  • They are harmed by being given the choice to procreate or not.
  • It's wrong to harm people, even by giving them choices.
  • No condoms; babies for everyone. (Interestingly, this could be taken a step further, toward outlawing celibacy or forcing in vitro fertilization for the celibate, but that's too silly even for the Catholic church, isn't it?)

In the other direction, the birth-proscription argument goes like this:

  • The right not to procreate is important, compared to the right to procreate.
  • Given the right to reproduce, people who don't wish to breed may feel they have to justify their decision, to their parents, grandparents, and spouse, for instance. They may rationally choose to procreate rather than be responsible for destroying their families' procreation interests.
  • They are harmed by the choice to reproduce.
  • Birth control pills in the water.

Given the judo-like nature of the argument, it must be clear by now that everything depends upon where the initial assessment of value is set. But at least this must counter the objection to antinatalism, that birth can be a good thing for the person who is born because it gives him greater freedom and more options, compared to not existing. Options, we have seen, are often in and of themselves a serious harm.

21 comments:

  1. A thought provoking, as well as highly detailed piece of work here, curator. It's gonna take a while for this feeble brain to eek out all the practical implications, but here's what immediately strikes me...

    I think your evaluation that a lot depends on the pre-suppositional starting point is dead-on. The feeling that 'moral' or 'institutional' rights somehow translate to 'intrinsic' or as Chip might prefer, 'natural' rights is an intuitive misstep...one that's almost universally made, btw. Preferences magically become standardized, and before you know it, ethicists are talking about 'objective' values, forgetting the values' origins in personal inclinations, which later down the road become codified. All such talk about rights and wrongs pertaining to objective evaluation is no different than saying that your preference for chocolate ice cream is immoral, because most of us prefer vanilla.

    Moreover, due to the many shades of gray existing between the polarized denotations, there's always going to be a level of arbitrariness regarding practical application (which pretty much wipes out the original premise, in my view).

    Of course, this is the way laws work. The official age of 'adulthood' in America is 18 (barring drinking, for some reason). Even if we ignore the disparity of emotional maturity spread across age groups, I doubt that anybody could come up with more than a very vague and fuzzy set of criteria, if pressed. It's a generalized rule of thumb, if you will, and not a particularly good one.

    It's the same when we try to define what is harmful beyond the most general terms; there's so much white noise involved, where things like religious belief, cultural programming, conflicting personal interests and the like all color the picture. None of it makes a hell of a lot of sense to me; and, as you've so admirably demonstrated, such arguments can wind up being used to support either side of the original position, according to what pre-suppositions you're starting with.

    In the end, I opt for personal autonomy here, since, when and if it errs, it errs on the side of the person who's most affected. Social obligations be damned; let the person die if that's what they want. No matter the harm or harmlessness of the choice, in the end, all the harm to the agent in question ends, once and for all. It's funny how common sense fails when it comes to talking about human mortality. Where animals are involved, the path to sympathetic resolution is usually pretty clear. Why can't it be so with us?

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  2. With "the initial assessment of value" left open to competing preferences, it seems that Velleman's argument -- at least in its presumptive form wrt suicide rights -- might not ultimately escape the charge of paternalism. In a sense, doesn't it just shift the focus of the paternalistic conceit to protect an an actor not from his assumed deficit in decision-making ability but from the presumed wrongness of his foundational values?

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  3. Jim, I'm actually not being entirely fair to Velleman in my post, because he did write an entire paper justifying his refusal to recognize a moral right to suicide; I just haven't read it yet. He's not just pulling it out of his ass and saying "it's just wrong," the way we're probably used to hearing (at least I am). He indicates that his paper relies on Kantian deontology (not treating people as mere means to an end, categorical imperatives, telling the Nazis at your door that you have Jews in the basement because it would be wrong to lie . . . ), which always leaves my intuitions behind pretty quickly, so I still think your concern with "forgetting the values' origins in personal inclinations" is likely 100% accurate. I'll let you know when I manage to slog through it.

    My ethical leanings put a huge amount of weight on individual consent and choice, as you can tell, but I am actually somewhat persuaded by Velleman's examples, that choice can be a harm. I think preventing suffering must be on approximately equal footing with freedom. But ultimately I see death rights as being on equal footing with life rights.

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  4. Chip - that's very interesting. There's something incredibly disrespectful about saying "yes, you want this option, but I think you would be harmed by having that option, and you're wrong to even want that option, so you don't get it."

    Velleman calls his paper a consequentialist argument, so ideally, I guess, we'd be thinking about it from a sort of Original Position situation - if you didn't know ahead of time what body you'd wake up in, would you want the society you'd wake up in to recognize a right to suicide? Velleman argues you wouldn't, even if you woke up in a suffering body, because many people would still want to live - and here's where your point comes in - and it would be wrong for them to intentionally die. Maybe he's sneaking in a bit of deontology there. I'll have to think about that.

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  5. "Some people, of course - I put myself on this list - would prefer to die, but might not wish to explicitly choose death. Given that we are stuck with a "choice" to live, many of us continue to live, miserably, rather than bear the responsibility for the harm our deaths may cause."

    Probably like most people, I find this hard to believe. I assume you don't have children, and that you're an adult, so the negative effect you would have on others by killing yourself seems pretty bounded. (And there are other options, like pretending to have a religious conversion and moving far away to become a hermit--but really committing suicide--that could even further reduce the suffering your death would cause.)

    Do you address this in another post? The existence/prevalence of the situation you are claiming is pretty central to your program.

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    1. For one thing, I'm in love - but really, I am so sick of this shit-or-get-off-the-pot thinking when it comes to suicide. If someone is held in prison illegally, nobody asks him why he didn't try to escape. Suicide is hard - mentally as well as physically! Our brains fuck us in all kinds of ways.

      This kind of view seems common among high-IQ folks on the autism spectrum. I don't really know any other kinds of people well, so I can't speak for them. But I am suspicious of the "counting noses" approach to ethics. A thousand people's vague inclination might not weigh against a single person's strong conviction. (Some of us draw the line of a "person" around 130 IQ...)

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    2. I'm sorry. I didn't mean to offend.

      If someone is held in prison illegally in a dictatorship, but the backdoor is left open with a trail leading to a plane heading home, people *will* ask why he didn't try to escape. But if there is a guard standing outside the open door, they will not. So the question boils down to: how hard is it?

      If I understand you correctly, you are saying that the *real* obstacles are internal/psychological, rather than the external obstacles you have criticized in the past (e.g. the illegality of barbiturates.) And further, these internal obstacles cannot be easily analyzed with the methods which come naturally to many smart people.

      If so, then I think you should concentrate on these points. It may be true that suicide ought to be made easy *given* your claim that there are many people who would be better off dead. But most folks don't accept this, and you need to convince them about these internal obstacles. Talking about the legality of barbiturates, or the strong-arm nature of suicide prevention, is a distraction.

      I'm really glad to hear you're in love.

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    3. There is no one, single "the real" issue here: there are many issues. The fact that barbiturates are illegal is a serious problem, and I'm not sure why you're saying it's a "distraction" - areas of life that humans take seriously and impute meaning to frequently exist on multiple levels, not just one. The fact that a miserable person can't access barbiturates is one problem. Contra Bryan Caplan, suicide is physically hard; we don't live in a society where suicide is easy.

      The fact that this is not the ONLY barrier to escaping the world does not make it irrelevant. Even if barbiturates were legal, I don't think that would make it ethical to, e.g., breed, because of the psychological and other barriers to suicide we are discussing here.

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    4. To expand on this just a little, the fact that there are some of us who linger longer than others beyond the time that we'd like to die must be seen as necessary for the pro-suicide ideas to be expressed. If you require us to die instantly as soon as we feel that suicide is desirable, none of us will be left to explain ourselves. This is why I find challenges to my "real" suicidality offensive: it's irrelevant to the ideas.

      One of the challenges before Roe v. Wade got to the Supreme Court was "mootness" - by the time a woman got to the Supreme Court on an abortion case, it would be way past 9 months later, making the issue of whether she had access to an abortion irrelevant (moot). But the justices decided that similarly-situated plaintiffs would keep showing up, so they allowed her to plead her case despite "mootness." Keep this in mind when reading what I write about suicidality: think about whether you are demanding "proof" of sincerity that would prevent anyone from being around to make these arguments.

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    5. If no one were around to make these arguments, the arguments themselves would be practically irrelevant. If all those who want to die could simply wish themselves out of existence, we wouldn't have right to die debates, not only because one side was silenced, but primarily because the problem itself would have dissolved.

      I agree about the legality of barbiturates and forced hospitalization issues. But the cost of being pro-choice is the responsibility of handling one's own options. The psychological barriers don't just apply to life vs. death, they also apply to other ideologically contested areas of life, say, employment or consensual prostitution, or the legality of drugs. The flip side of not having to choose is not being able to choose. Then other people will choose for you, and "protect you from yourself". And we all know the mess that creates in practice.

      As an antinatalist, you can bypass all this by pointing out that, if life is never started, the burden of choice is never experienced. While technically true, it does deprive people of a core choice, namely the option to choose life for themselves.

      Imagine a hypothetical world in which there is no toddler stage, but all people come into existence in a state of knowledge and cognitive functionality. The first thing they have to choose is whether they want to live life or immediately cease to exist again, without pain or distress. Would they really be harmed by the option to live? In that hypothetical world, I'd agree with Caplan that life would be a freely disposable good, and creating the option is pure benefit for the affected individuals.

      I can relate to the psychological barriers, they apply to all the above mentioned areas of life. But comparatively speaking, the burden of choice is a luxury problem. It's like people complaining they have too much money, or too many sexual options, or too much freedom of speech. I would neither destroy the option of life over this, nor would I force people to exist without consent.

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    6. Sounds like you agree with me on all the hard policy issues, then?

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    7. Pretty much. It's not a majority position, unfortunately. I do think the option of voluntary euthanasia, at least for terminally ill people, is gaining more public favor over time, but suicide as a legitimate option for everyone is a while off. Maybe some common political grounds can be found with libertarians. And are there any political activist groups defending patients' rights (e.g. against involuntary hospitalizaion)?

      I think it's important to frame this as the human rights issue it really is to get people to re-think their conceptions of benevolence, to show them the human cost of non-consensual impositions. I have some hope that the internet can play a huge role here; it's generally the best medium we've ever had to mainstream perspectives that the currently mainstream media are reluctant to allow.

      But I wouldn't wait for policy changes regarding my own life, I have my helium option well-prepared right here, usable within half an hour if I really need to. I predict the survival probability would be low. It took me forever, including for the above mentioned psychological reasons, but bringing about political change is way harder than figuring out how to bypass their impositions in practice. One of the reasons I see political activism as altruism + social role-playing games, you're never really better off trying to change so many minds than subverting their practical power.

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    8. "If someone is held in prison illegally in a dictatorship, but the backdoor is left open with a trail leading to a plane heading home, people *will* ask why he didn't try to escape. But if there is a guard standing outside the open door, they will not. So the question boils down to: how hard is it?

      "If I understand you correctly, you are saying that the *real* obstacles are internal/psychological, rather than the external obstacles you have criticized in the past (e.g. the illegality of barbiturates.)"

      Do you think the average non-South-or-Central-American (i.e., rich and influential) mob boss has prison attempts this easy? Or do you think most prison attempts are far riskier and dangerous and even more painful, with a much lower chance of succeeding, and with a great risk of adding to one's sentence -- harm -- if not carried out?

      Likewise, depending on country (which is largely determined by what chemicals, etc., are available, as well as firearms availability and so forth), only between 1 in 6 and 1 in 20 suicide attempts are successful.

      Forgetting the psychological difficulty of suicide, do you not also think it's physically difficult to do?

      You realize most gunshot wounds in battle or a fight don't produce death, right?

      Now I'm not an expert on killing, but I do have some military training and the ability to think rationally. Therefore this isn't based on experience, but I think you'll agree it's logically sound.

      Physically -- say in self-defense or in war -- if a person decided to kill another, when the other person experiences pain, injury, and increasing disability or loss of consciousness, this would make it easier to kill them, no?

      Those exact same things would make it harder to kill yourself. Instincts kick in and also the diminishing abilities mean you can no longer apply whatever type of force/trauma effectively.

      So I don't think you can assume all the barriers are psychological.

      Heck, only 17/20 self-inflicted gunshots are fatal -- and unsuccessful ones certainly would reduce your odds of another successful go.

      Would you want to take a 15% chance of turning yourself into a, possibly in severe permanent pain, brain injured person?

      Do you like those odds?

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  6. Arguing over barbiturates without making it clear that your position is conditional on a disputed empirical claim is as effective as arguing over seat belt laws without making it clear you think the accepted evidence that they save lives is flawed. Yes, there are arguments against seat belt laws based on liberty even if they do save lives, but if you disagree with the consensus about the empirical facts, then that is an infinitely more effective and important discussion to have. As far as I can tell, you grant that if there really *aren't* a lot of rational, clear-thinking people out there who want to die but can't then laws against barbiturates are justified.

    Second, I don't understand your reference to the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" aspects of Roe v. Wade. One, there are plenty of people who argue for rights which they themselves don't exercise. Courts restrict plaintiffs to have standing, but there is no such restrictions in philosophy or politics. (Yes, you can claim as above that that depressed people have special evidence not accessible to the rest of us, and therefore we must be on the look out for their special arguments, but this is a tall claim which is hardly obvious.) Two, and more importantly, the proof I am demanding is the actual deaths by suicide which I think should exist if the world were like as you claim it is. This is like anthropic reasoning. Just because we wouldn't be around to experience a universe without gravity doesn't mean our observations of gravity don't imply that it's real.

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    1. I'm sorry, what's the disputed empirical claim you're referring to?

      People close-reading blog comments on a four-year-old blog post is motivating me to finish my fucking book, though. <3

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    2. Sorry, that should have been a reply to thread we were in. Also, I emphasize that OtherAnonymous may agree with you about the hard policy issues, but he or she appears to agree with me that your Roe v. Wade argument doesn't go through.

      Oh and lastly: you say that you find challenges to your "real" suicidality offensive because it's irrelevant to the ideas. But you are arguing that the suicidal have special access to evidence which *can't* be inferred behaviorally by Bryan Caplan. That is, you are saying that *you personally* have special evidence which can only be described as it was experienced by you but cannot be inferred from other observations that Caplan could make. If so, shouldn't you expect him and I to critically analyze your motivations, looking for other explanations for why you say what you say? I don't think that the true nature of the suicidal claims is irrelevant to the ideas, because it specifically addresses the trustworthiness of the evidence.

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    3. (Whoops, and I was writing this second comment when you posted your question.)

      The empirical claim is whether or not there are lots of people out there who are better off dead but do not commit suicide because of internal mental barriers.

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    4. If it's not clear already, I find your commentary unusually insightful even if I don't agree with most of your program. (And I mean insightful in the sense that your treatment of the issues is smart and clear, *not* just in the status-whoring sense that your struggles give you an uncommon perspective.) I would be the first in line to buy your book.

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    5. status-whoring

      LOL

      So I think I see what you mean - to be clear, I'm much more concerned with legalizing barbiturates than with supplying axe-murdering squads to pick off sad people. In the absence of barbiturates, though, what evidence of being "better off dead" would seem acceptable?

      My problem with "why doncha just kill yourself" - suicide as only evidence of sincerity - is precisely that suicide is difficult. If suicide were made much less difficult, I'd have much less of a problem with this kind of sincerity test.

      One line of evidence I've been playing with over the past year or so, regarding people's subjective perceptions of the value of their lives, is how they act in terms of valuing their lives. Do people fail to invest time and energy in avoiding death simpliciter (as opposed to signalling)? Do they take large, uncompensated risks of death? If so, that's evidence that they'd be better off dead, in some sense. I've written about this semi-formally in the following pieces:

      Born Obligated: A Place for Quantitative Methods in Ethics

      Blind to the Downside

      What Kind of Evidence for Effective Suicidality?

      College as Suicide Gamble

      The Mathematics of Misery: What Human Behavior Teaches Us About the Value of Life

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    6. "People close-reading blog comments on a four-year-old blog post is motivating me to finish my fucking book, though. <3 "

      Get used to it -- I plan on reading every single post you wrote, if I have adequate time ... and commenting on any point I find particularly interesting.

      There are a lot.

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