Kevin Caruso, in a piece titled "Don't I Have the Right to Die by Suicide?" attempts to scare people into calling a suicide hotline on the grounds that there is, in fact, no moral right to commit suicide. (Note that Caruso is the one who says we should use the unnatural phrase "die by suicide" instead of the more natural construction "commit suicide" because the latter is hurtful to the friends and family of people who commit suicide.)
Many of Caruso's questions are answered more formally in my essay, "The Harms of Suicide." But I think it is worthwhile to have a single document answering a representative set of (implied) pro-forced-life arguments.
Caruso poses questions (typeset in bold), to which I propose answers (typeset in regular typeface):
Do you have the right to devastate your family?
We often "devastate" our families by exercising our rights. Some "devastate" their families by coming out of the closet, or by refusing to be doctors, or by moving across the country, or by refusing to have children. Where concerns of personal autonomy and suffering outweigh the interests of others in maintaining our company, then we do indeed have the right to "devastate" others.
Do you have the right to cause intense, almost unbearable pain for all of the loved ones that you leave behind?
Everyone dies. Nothing we can do will prevent our own death, nor the suffering our death will cause to those close to us. Suicide merely causes this pain to be experienced earlier.
In fact, the policy of suicide prohibition and prevention - not the act of suicide itself - must be seen as a major cause of the special pain and grief suffered by suicide survivors. (Also, not everyone is lucky enough to have "loved ones." Are lonely people free to commit suicide, according to Caruso?)
Do you have the right to take away any possibility that you would get better?
Who has the right to decide whether a given treatment is in one's best interests, or not? With physical illnesses like cancer, the decision rests with the patient as to whether a given treatment is worth the suffering it entails. We have the right to refuse treatment. With good reason - many treatments for suicidality, while possibly effective, are so damaging as to simply not be worth the cost. And, as with cancer, for some people, nothing works.
Do you have the right to take away all of the wonderful things in life that you have yet to experience?
Who but me has a right to decide whether the suffering the rest of my life will entail exceeds the value of the "wonderful things in life" I have yet to experience?
Do you have the right to take an action that is a permanent solution to a temporary problem?
One of the most common mushy-headed objections to suicide is that it is a "permanent solution to a temporary problem." In reality, for many of us, suffering is an all-too-permanent problem.
Do you have the right to cause irreversible brain damage to yourself if your suicide is not completed?
Damage to oneself as a result of an unsuccessful suicide attempt is entirely an artifact of the suicide prohibition. Given a genuine right to comfortable, reliable suicide, this would simply not occur.
Do you have the right to cause yourself to become disfigured if your suicide is not completed?
See above. And, yes, one has the right to cause oneself to become "disfigured" by body modification. But an unchosen disfigurement caused by a suicide attempt is a sad consequence of the immoral suicide prohibition.
Do you have the right to cause yourself permanent paralysis if your suicide is not completed?
See above. Paralysis and akinetic mutism caused by suicide attempts are tragic consequences of the suicide prohibition, not of suicide.
Do you have the right to end your life instead of focusing on ending your pain? (It is the pain that you want to end, not your life.)
The pain may well be permanent. Caruso naively assumes that a given suicide has not done anything to try to alleviate his pain. But, yes, one has the right to decide when one has done enough to try to alleviate one's pain, and when the pain appears permanent enough that a permanent solution is indicated. One's life is one's own.
Do you have the right to not receive treatment for the mental illness that you probably have -- the treatment that will make you better?
Generally, we do have the right to refuse treatment - even potentially life-saving treatment - in the interest of bodily autonomy.
Again, "treatment" for mental illness is not a sure-fire way of relieving the suffering that leads to suicidality. Caruso assures us that treatment "will make you better," but that is hardly the case for all suffering people. It is unfair and cruel to cheerfully assume that anyone can get better if he just tries the next experimental treatment.
I have written extensively on the mistaken idea that suicide is caused by mental illness. Even Thomas Joiner proposes that suicide is not caused by mental illness on its own, but rather by the alignment of the ability to commit suicide with the desire to commit suicide.
And mental illness causes severe suffering. Don't the mentally ill, as much as the physically ill, have a right to end their pain?