Friday, September 28, 2012

Life, Pain, and Revealed Preference

Everyone alive suffers, yet most living people seem to be glad to be alive. Few commit suicide, and death is feared by most.

How do we know if the pain of life is made up for by other factors? Introspection is a popular method (especially what I call the "imaginary survey," in which one imagines people's responses to being asked whether they are glad to be born). But introspection is also flawed in terms of accuracy even as to how well one's own life has gone, and introspection does not help us compare the suffering of one person to the happiness of another. 

I have proposed that we look at sources of data other than introspection to figure out how much people really value or lament life and its pains and pleasures (see Mathematics of Misery, Born Obligated, What Kind of Evidence for Effective Suicidality? and Blind to the Downside). We could, I argue, look at how people act, what they buy, eat, smoke, and do. Rather than asking them about their preferences, their preferences might be revealed to us through their behavior.

A recent episode of the Radiolab podcast examined the pain scale used by doctors - a scale to measure a person's pain, from "no pain" to "worst pain imaginable." The podcast reveals the subjectivity of the scale and its inadequacy for making medical judgments; an interviewee imagines the "worst pain imaginable" to be the pain of being dragged behind a pickup truck to one's death, and imagines her pain to be about a third of that; a "3" on the pain scale, subjectively severe and interfering with her life, but dismissed by her doctor.

Her father, a doctor, recommends she report her pain as an "8" in order to be taken seriously. More interestingly, he suggests a more revealing pain scale: one that asked what sufferers would be willing to do to get rid of their pain. Get a really bad haircut, perhaps? Accept a reduced lifespan?

When I was younger, I suffered from severe migraines. In the early days of the internet, I read about trepanation and it seemed like a live option for at least two years; it was my beloved fantasy. A few days into a bad migraine when I was 19, I took the train to Rites of Passage and had a large needle, and then a ring, inserted into the flesh of my navel, hoping it might relieve the pain. (It didn't, though it did take my mind off of it.) Clearly, the revealed preference of a trade-off for pain reflects the subjective value for the person at both ends: I might have been experiencing extremely severe pain to consider piercing my skull and my body, or I might just not disvalue bodily envelope violations very much. However, data about the actual choices of thousands of people would give us evidence of the relative value of different choices for large numbers of people; while not perfect, it would be better than mere introspection.

So is life a burden, or a blessing? What are people willing to do for a longer lifespan, compared to what they're willing to do in order to die? 

In the United States, around 36,000 people successfully commit suicide every year, despite the fact that suicide is illegal (on pain of resuscitation and incarceration in a mental hospital), risky, difficult, and painful, and despite the additional fact that it is illegal for others to help in any way. Worldwide, over a million people successfully commit suicide every year.

Cryonic preservation represents a chance to be reborn; one must still die, but one's brain and perhaps body are preserved in the hope of one day being reanimated. Cryonics is legal and (since it takes place after death) painless, and it is legal for others to help one achieve cryonic preservation. Cryonic preservation costs around $150,000, considerably less than the cost to raise an average American child to age 18 (not including college). In spite of this, only about a thousand people have ever signed up for cryonic preservation. The number of people who have ever signed up for cryonics in the history of the world is the same as the number who die from suicide in the United States every ten days.

While people may go to great lengths to postpone death, they do not seem to reveal a particular preference for a chance to be born again. Indeed, while life in the abstract seems to be of supreme importance, other factors can be shown to drastically outweigh the supposedly sacred value of life. For instance, studies suggest that castration may extend male lifetimes by decades, yet castrating oneself or one's son seems unthinkable, even with the lifespan enhancement effects in mind. While life may be valuable, it seems that sexual capacity, gender expression, and reproductive capacity are revealed as much more important than life simpliciter. 

The fact that so many people are willing to take great risks to end their lives in order to escape the bad parts of life, and so few are willing to make serious sacrifices to be born again or drastically extend life, is evidence that life is not always a blessing, and is frequently, observably, a burden. We should continue to investigate data to determine the lived reality of the value of life and pain, and should incorporate this knowledge into our reproductive ethics. Reproduction can no longer be seen as a purely innocent endeavor, but must be recognized as a very serious gamble with the life of an innocent being.

Tuesday, September 18, 2012

Trying to See Through: A Unified Theory of Nerddom

There is a single characteristic, I argue, that defines and unites the cognitive community that you and I share if you are reading this (the community of nerds). These days we often identify as rationalists, skeptics, or atheists, interested in cognition and cognitive biases; we are likely to eat LSD at Burning Man. We read analytic philosophy, science fiction, and LessWrong. We are intelligent, socially awkward, and heavily male. Is there a good name for that?

Lucid Dream

Intelligence and social awkwardness partially explain many of the patterns of our community, but neither is the characteristic I have in mind. This characteristic may be explained by analogy to lucid dreaming (incidentally, a common interest of our members). Dreams ordinarily fool us; despite their incoherence, we accept them as fully real while we are in them. 

With effort, over time, you can get in the habit of performing "reality checks" during waking life: trying to push your fingers through solid surfaces, perhaps, or to breathe with airways closed. When asking, "am I dreaming?" and testing coherence becomes enough of an aspect of everyday reality, you may start performing reality checks in dreams, too. If you are successful, your reward will be an insight denied to most people: knowledge of the fact that you are dreaming.

Dreams demonstrate that our brains (and even rat brains) are capable of creating complex, immersive, fully convincing simulations. Waking life is also a kind of dream. Our consciousness exists, and is shown particular aspects of reality. We see what we see for adaptive reasons, not because it is the truth. Nerds are the ones who notice that something is off - and want to see what's really going on.

Our People

Communal belief - social reality - and the sacrednesses that it produces are precisely the powerful layers of distortion that we are likely to notice (and hence have a chance at seeing through). We are less able than normal humans to perceive social/sacredness reality in the first place, and to make matters worse, we are addicted to the insight rewards that come from trying to see through it even further. Autism is overrepresented in our community; depression, too. Autism is associated with a reduced ability to model other brains in the normal, social way; this failure carries even into modeling the mind of God, as autism is inversely linked to belief in God. The autistic person is more likely than the neurotypical to notice that social reality exists; we might say the autistic person gets a lucid dreaming reality check for the great social dream with every inscrutable (to him) human action he witnesses. 

Mild depression removes pleasurable feelings from everyday life; it interferes with a mechanism for sacredness-maintenance distinct from the theory of mind path autism blocks. Meaning is deconstructed in depression; social connection is weakened. Ideas and things that for normal individuals glow with significance appear to the depressed person as empty husks. The deceptive power of social and sacredness illusions is weakened for the depressed person (as are certain other healthy illusions, such as the illusion of control). This is not necessarily a victory for him, as self-deception is strongly related to happiness; the consolation of insight may not make up for the loss of sacredness in terms of individual happiness. The characteristic that distinguishes us is not necessarily a good thing. Our overdeveloped, grotesque insight reward seeking is likely maladaptive, and is probably not even doing our individual selves any good. Extremists - those most capable of perceiving social/sacred reality - are happiest.

There is no difference in IQ between the sexes - on average. It is only at the high and low ends of the distribution that sex differences show up, with males more likely than females to exhibit very high or very low IQ. The trait of being oriented toward social and sacred reality, however, does likely vary between the sexes on average. Females are more religious than males, and more oriented toward communal belief and social reality. At the extremes, this sex difference is likely even more apparent (as with autism). Members of our community, I argue, select in by being high on the trait of seeing through social/sacred illusions; or, to put it another way, low on the trait of perceiving social/sacred reality. This explains the drastic male skew of our sex ratio better than intelligence.

Recursion and self-reference are uniting themes in our community. We are constantly trying to jump out of ourselves to look at ourselves. Our predilections for abstraction on the one hand, and psychedelic drugs on the other, feed our addiction to insight - to understanding new things about the understander. We do not smoke marijuana just to laugh and eat brownie batter, but for the front-row seats it gives us on our own cognition. We desire insight, but also meta-insight. Because of this multi-layered awareness, we have a complicated relationship with ambiguity: awareness of it, and conflicting desires to embrace it and to stamp it out (as if such a thing were possible). We are aware that information is present on more than one level of abstraction (or sincerity); some of us play the game and communicate on multiple levels at once, and others hold out for legible progress through sincerity.

Our culture's fascination with "meta-" - seeing the next level of abstraction, applying principles to themselves - is identical with this seeing-through trait. Many nominal members of our community have a hard time with this, because they are not true cognitive members of our community. They think of "meta" as when you watch Doctor Horrible at Monster House while dressed as Doctor Horrible characters. That's fine for them, but I think it's important to distinguish between the actual cognitive bases of our community, and the cultural confusion that comes from our culture's over-inclusiveness. 

Science fiction has united our culture for human generations, because it has been a reliable source of insight porn. Philip K. Dick's stories deliver heavy, refined doses of insight, for instance. But there is another layer of something that calls itself science fiction, designed to appeal to a broader audience than the insight-addicted core members, that merely recycles the tropes of science fiction literature and offers no real insight reward. Why are so many of us in love with Julian Jaynes even though it's batshit insane and obviously wrong? Because it's satisfying, amazing science fiction: insight porn that delivers. The fact of its wrongness does not reduce the pleasure it provides, any more than the fictional nature of a lateral thinking puzzle makes it less fun. 

We are aware that we are embodied beings with egos, but we are constantly trying to get around this - all the while realizing, at another level, that we can never truly lose our embodied perspective or think with something other than our evolved brains. Layers of self-glorifying self-deprecation illustrate our complicated relationship with ourselves. 

We are likely to have started out socially awkward - failing to automatically perceive all the social subtleties that our normal cohort noticed instinctively. Some of us have figured out social belonging using parts of our brain not adapted for this purpose; but most of us experience the normal human ache for social belonging, friendship, bonding, and sex, even more so if we have been unlucky in securing it. 

But our attraction to each other is not just an animal desire for company.

We realize the limitations of our individual monkey brains. We wonder if, by linking our monkey brains up with other monkey brains, we might form a Super Brain capable of insight unavailable to us as individuals. We long for not just any old community, but an epistemic community. 

A lot of us get stuck in traps. We become aware of a powerful insight (atheism, feminism, conspiracy theories) and begin to think it explains all of reality. We commit to our hard-won but limited set of insights until they calcify, protecting us from the trauma (and the pleasure) of further insights.

Many of us become heavily invested in already being right, and in others being wrong. This limits our ability to understand the world, since the world contains myriad beings who are all wrong in fascinating ways, and no beings who see only the pure truth. The folklorist Linda Degh inspired me with her writing on the "Apollo Moon Landing Hoax" conspiracy theory; to see her study the belief as folklore, rather than merely condemn it as factually incorrect, seemed like a fertile approach. To move toward reality, it is more effective to study and understand a strange belief than to reject it without study. Examining strange beliefs may be the lucid-dream reality check we need to examine our own normal-seeming beliefs. The most satisfying and useful insight is meta-insight: insight about our own cognitive processes.

The Sad State of Insight Porn

Huge segments of the background human culture cater to stimulating the humor reward circuit; not so for the closely related but distinct insight reward circuit. "Insight porn," to the extent that it exists, is of marginal cultural importance compared to humor, and is generally of much lower quality. Puzzles, mystery stories, perhaps even political commentary, trigger the insight reward circuit in a degraded way; even the lowest pattern-recognition games are capable of it. But its market share is a tiny fraction of that of comedy. We are deprived of art that could satisfy our desires. We must look to each other, and to the world, to satisfy our curiosity, boredom, and confusion with sweet insight. 

Why should it be that art catering to humor is more plentiful and of higher quality than art catering to the insight reward circuit? There is a clear humor sex difference, with men producing more humor (and expected to produce more humor) and women consuming more humor (and expecting to consume more humor). Humor may have implications as a mating quality indicator. Insight is more dangerous, and as I have argued, there may be sex differences in the orientation toward this kind of insight. Unlike humor, women aren't, as a group, especially interested in puzzles and insights; men are both the main producers and the main consumers of insight art like chess problems and strategic games. Humor has been a good characteristic for selection to act on; it is relatively safe and a good indicator of the quality of one's mind. Insight is not so safe, and may even be an indicator against cooperativeness (contrary to the adaptive value of religion, for instance). This may explain why there are dozens of comedy clubs in Los Angeles, but not a single club where one can go to solve lateral thinking puzzles with masters of the genre (if you know of any, please hook me up). Humor can even inoculate us against threatening ideas, such as evolution and religion.  

It is a great thrill to be epistemically pushed off of your reality - to have the universe drop out beneath you, like a carnival ride. We may not exactly believe extraordinary claims, such as the claim that the Dark Ages did not take place, but it is exciting and moving to think how weak and indirect our knowledge of such things truly is. 

In some ways, the domain of visual art has done a better job than the domain of science in promoting the nerd value of seeing through social/sacred illusions. For centuries, art and science were on similar paths, accumulating insights, undergoing paradigm shifts: infant proportions and perspective in art, say, and heliocentrism and germ theory of disease in science. Over the past hundred years, art has endured many iterations of waking up, seeing itself, and eating itself, from cubism to urinals-as-art; science, however, is barely entering the first cycle of meta-science, of examining the implementation of its methods with its own methods. 

Severe mental illness is so common among serious visual artists that it's practically a job qualification; it's rare in the sciences (though less rare in abstract math and philosophy). Of course there are good reasons for this, but the selection effect is cognitively important. Science has done a better job than art (and marginally better than math and philosophy) at protecting itself from radically different ways of thinking, hence insights about itself. 

False Insight as Hypnosis

The popularity of the viral political documentary Zeitgeist: The Movie illustrates that insight porn, properly pitched to the sophistication of the viewer, can have almost hypnotic power. The techniques used to create the illusion of insight in this film may seem rudimentary and clumsy to us, but they are sophisticated enough to trigger the sensation of a major breakthrough in those with less jaded (well, sophisticated) insight-detection mechanisms. Having access to insight just one level up from one's listeners - not too many levels of abstraction up for them to grasp - is a powerful tool. You can see why the ability would exist; our insight obsession has just gone off the rails, perhaps, into superstimulus land. 

The most ubiquitous trick in Zeitgeist is the use of simple pictures to make statements sound more truthful. Though the pictures presented are not probative of anything, their mere presence makes statements feel more like reached-for insights. This technique is used throughout, but nowhere more shamelessly than when Jesus' crown of thorns is revealed to be...solar flares. (At this point technically you have to drink.)

Other than the picture-truthiness trick, the documentary skillfully uses abstraction and far-mode inductions to produce the feeling of insight in naive users. The narrator (aided by illustrations) identifies similarities between past religions (often too quickly to read), attempting to reduce them to patterns. These taxonomied myths are described and owned by the narrator (and, presumably, the viewer), who is now above them in status. Satellite photos give the same impression of abstract understanding. Clips of old movies depicting religious events provide comic relief, emphasizing the superiority of the abstract view presented in the documentary over the silly, obviously incorrect specifics imagined years ago. Simple statements ("This is the Sun.") hypnotize the viewer so that more controversial statements can sneak in. Levels of abstraction are abruptly switched, invoking confusion hungry for resolution. The known and the unknown are combined to produce the feeling of insight in the viewer; if the mood is set right and the right illustration is being projected, an alleged mistranslation can feel like the deepest mystery resolved. When the scary, nasty forces of evil are introduced, near-mode fear is induced with threatening loud noises. A word or phrase is repeated ("there was an explosion") until it is divorced from context and seems more likely to have the meaning the filmmakers desire us to take from it than the meaning we would normally take from it. 

Jesus taught in parables, a bit like lateral thinking puzzles. He didn't simply say "here is the rule guys" - he told a whole story from which you were supposed to make not-always-obvious connections, and he outright admitted that the stories were capable of interpretation on multiple levels. The study of Talmud presents opportunities for complex insights within its intricate logical structure (this is true, though somewhat less true, of the study of law). Insight porn does not have to be true to be effective; it merely has to be geared to the sophistication of its audience, producing insights of the right size. Any given insight may be illusion; reality is best served when we are skeptical of each new insight. 

We have learned to glorify insight itself. If that is our policy, we must avoid clinging to any particular insight or truth. All must be fair game for our hungry insight addictions to feed on. It is painful to have one's calcified insights challenged (as alluded to earlier regarding conspiracy theories), but by belonging to the cognitive community of people like us, don't we consent to this threat of upheaval? We may properly pity the rest of humanity so much that we don't interfere with their healthy, comfortable fixed beliefs, but shouldn't our charity evaporate when we remember that they govern and control us based on their silly sacrednesses? 

The child in the Emperor's New Clothes is one of us. He is most likely autistic - most children, even at a very young age, can feel the social sacredness and act accordingly (perhaps even dogs) - but not this child. It is amazing that the story is preserved. But its form is so neat and tidy, this old tale - it lets us deal with fear and uncertainty surrounding our vague awareness of the social falsity. Does the child find any epistemic peers who agree? The comforting myth is that if one person points it out, the error will become obvious to all and be corrected. More likely, the child is shouted down or executed. We are children calling to each other - in a dog whistle, often, so the bigger group isn't motivated to discipline us. 


Second Addendum: In Which the Author's Attitude Toward Insight Porn is Clarified

This post has gotten around! I have noticed that my tendency to use dysphemisms for things I like has resulted in a widespread misunderstanding - that there is something inherently wrong with "insight porn." On the contrary, I think what I am calling "insight porn" includes the best of human culture.

First, the concern I have with the poorer sorts of insight porn is not that they promise wisdom and fail to deliver, but simply that they are not appropriate for people on the high end of the intelligence/curiosity distribution. Second, my problem, if I have one, is not with insight porn itself; what I have is a suspicion for the feeling of insight in general.

The feeling of mirth (a reaction to humor) is, the authors of Inside Jokes argue, a reward-system response to the detection of a contradiction in one's mental space: one of the premises one had mentally committed to is found to be incorrect. It is the detection of a misfit. Insight, on the other hand, involves the detection of a fit - the detection of a pattern that allows the compression of information previously requiring more representational space. (This hypothesis is considered with regard to music in Nicholas Hudson's paper "Musical beauty and information compression: Complex to the ear but simple to the mind?")

Epistemically speaking, humor is a much safer route than insight to correct thinking. The feeling of humor detects a problem that is unlikely to not be a problem; unfortunately, insight is likely to provide only the illusion of a better, more elegant model of the world. While what I have dysphemistically called insight porn has inherent value in providing the feeling of insight, we should be more suspicious of the feeling of insight as representing greater wisdom or a more elegant, more accurate model of the moving parts of the world. Insight leaps often do provide more accurate, more elegant models of the world, as Hudson points out in the paper previously linked with regard to Darwin, Einstein, and others. But a person who has spend a great deal of his life having the feeling of insight may or may not have a more accurate, more elegant model of the world than someone who has more rarely experienced the feeling of insight. Caution is needed.


Addendum: Some Items of Insight Porn

A collection of insight porn operating at a fairly high level. This list does not distinguish between items which I believe give true insight into reality and those which merely provide the sensation of insight without an improved understanding of reality. Such a distinction may be relevant for other values, but not for the value of triggering the reward circuit I describe.

We rely on others familiar with alien domains to pass us the best stuff from their domains.

  • Julian Jaynes
  • Jean Baudrillard
  • the study of cognitive bias
  • evolutionary psychology, e.g. Daly & Wilson
  • simulationism (back to Descartes)
  • Bladerunner and the questioning of memories
  • Philip K. Dick, especially short stories
  • atheism, Higher Criticism, and religious studies
  • Talmud (Torah & commentaries, living formal domain)
  • Ribbonfarm
  • study of conspiracy theories, e.g. Moon Landing Hoax, Phantom Time Hypothesis
  • folklore (Linda Degh, V. Propp, Dan VanArsdale)
  • Kurt Vonnegut
  • Michael Swanwick (esp. Bones of the Earth)
  • Thomas Pynchon
  • phenomenology
  • lateral thinking puzzles
  • "Synchronicity" (Jung)
  • The Aquatic Ape
  • Roy Baumeister (Meanings of Life, social function of consciousness)
  • contrarianism (insight in part from noticing patterns in belief of others)
  • William Gibson
  • Neil Stephenson
  • Walter Gieseking
  • Monk, Coltrane, Miles Davis
  • lucid dreaming
  • Philippe Rochat's Others In Mind
  • Wisconsin Death Trip (Lesy)
  • Radiolab
  • marijuana
  • ketamine
  • Joseph Cornell
  • Freud's Interpretation of Dreams
  • Infinite Jest
  • John Thorne (e.g. Outlaw Cook)

Wednesday, September 5, 2012

Toward Non-Stupid, Non-Blank-Slatey Polyandry

"There is a theoretical debate...over the evolutionary status of human polyandry and whether it is truly an adaptation....We argue that marriage (or pair-bonding) is the adaptation."

Starkweather & Hames, "A Survey of Non-Classical Polyandry" (Human Nature 23:12, June 2012)


Humans are an effectively polygynous species; that is, the reproductive fitness variance of males exceeds the reproductive fitness variance of females. However, our degree of polygyny is not particularly high among primates; we have significant adaptations for pair bonding and monogamy. Daly & Wilson say (Homicide, p. 143) that "we are the products of a mild but sustained polygynous competition."

What about polyandry? Marriage relationships between a single female and multiple males has been understood to be extremely rare among humans, both based on anthropological evidence and for sound biological reasons; Daly & Wilson cite the classical source, Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas, for the proposition that "a tiny minority [of human societies] practice polyandrous marriage." Starkweather et al. mention that for the 1967 sample Daly & Wilson are citing, only seven societies are identified as practicing polyandry out of 1,167 societies in the sample. A tiny minority, indeed!

A popular blank-slatey denial of both polygyny and monogamy adaptations (and, some argue, the adaptation of pair bonding in general) has emerged in recent years, known as Sex At Dawn. I have not deigned to read this book, but I am informed and on that basis believe that its authors argue that humans are basically happy love monkeys cruelly forced into the strictures of monogamy by agricultural patriarchy. 

As a happy love monkey, I am, emotionally, extremely sympathetic to this ludicrous line of hogwash. Yes, human males are much bigger than human females, we mate face-to-face, males invest heavily in their children and exhibit violent sexual jealousy, and basically the picture is one of monogamy shading into polygyny - but what about our huge penises, huh? What could they be but beautiful twat squeegees? And what about the fact that cuckolding is the second most common heterosexual interest in pornography, after (the unquestionably adaptive characteristic) youth?

What theory truly accounts for all the facts about humans and their mating systems? This theory must not be a blank slate, must not be happy love monkeys (no adaptations after bonobos? really?) and must not be pure virtuous monogamous/polygynous females (else why the twat squeegees?). It must account for pair bonding, but also for occasional extrapair matings - for complicated but biologically sensible intrasexual and intersexual competition. 

There is no reason that a polyandrous society might not fall within the realm of possibilities of such a theory - given the right environmental or population constraints and the right social institutions. Indeed, in the article quoted at the beginning of this post, Starkweather and Hames find 53 societies that practice polyandry outside the classical societies surveyed by Murdock. While still a "tiny minority" of human societies, polyandry is a sensible model for the tiny minority of societies experiencing certain constraints.

What is the single biggest determinant of a society going polyandrous? It is, say Starkweather and Hames, a male-skewed operational sex ratio. That is, when there are way more males than females in a society, polyandry is a likely solution to that problem. This is true whether the operational sex ratio is temporarily skewed (by an unusual war), or permanently so (by, say, the practice of whale hunting). Temporary polyandry follows temporarily skewed sex ratios; stable polyandry follows stably-skewed sex ratios. There is evidence that the overall operational sex ratio in the Western world and China has become mildly male-skewed in recent decades; even this relatively mild skew has had measurable, culture-dependent effects.

Do we know of any communities that have massively male-skewed sex ratios?

Yeah, that would be us.

Who are "we"? We might identify as rationalist nerds. Many of us have IQs a couple-few standard devs above average, and many of us enjoy some form of Autistic Spectrum Disorder. Many of us read LessWrong, or are at least aware of LessWrong enough to pretend not to read LessWrong. Many of us pass through Senior House or East Campus at MIT; others, through Blacker House or Ricketts House at CalTech. We are particularly likely to chew nicotine gum despite never having smoked cigarettes (which only scratches the surface of our drug use). 

To some limping extent, we form a semi-endogamous community. How sex-skewed are we? Taking LessWrong as a sample of whatever we are, according to the 2011 survey, we are 89% male. An operational sex ratio of 204 males to 100 females, as found in Netsilik children, is considered extremely high, and is highly determinative of polyandry. Our LessWrong operational sex ratio would be 1056 males per 100 females.

This is gender skewing beyond what would be expected based on mere IQ; in the Scottish sample, there were 203 girls and 277 boys in the 140 band of the IQ test, for a skewed-but-not-ludicrous operational sex ratio of 136 boys per 100 girls. Whatever we are, we are not selecting in merely for intelligence, but likely also for other factors that are heavily dependent on sex.

As someone who lettered in both math team and cheerleading, polyandry has been a reality of my dating life since I was 16. (I am Presently in a Monogamous Relationship Okay.) Polyamory was already a buzzword at MIT in the mid-1990s, but my girlfriends and I didn't need anyone to tell us that we could have whoever we wanted PLUS whoever else we wanted, PLUS set all the rules, and if anybody didn't like it, they were mean, jealous crybabies. This is pretty much totally unfair, and I guess our emotional response to this unfairness was something like, "well, patriarchy sucked, payback's a bitch." 

However, despite the unfairness, it is not at all clear that the polyandrous polyamorous system in place in many elite bohemian communities is undesirable for the males involved. Indeed, many males in this system actively seek to promote it; this comment from Eliezer Yudkowsky is one of my favorite examples:

The following is a public service announcement to all women who naturally like at least some shy nerds.

If you are (1) polyamorous and (2) able to directly ask men you find attractive to sleep with you (instead of doing the sheep dance where you freeze motionless and wait for them to approach) - or if you can hack yourself to be like that without too much effort - it is vastly easier than you imagine to acquire an entire harem of high-status and/or handsome nerds.

(For some but not all nerds, this may require that you be reasonably attractive. Most nerd girls I know are reasonably attractive and think they are not. So if you think that you're overweight and hideous and yet oddly enough nerds spend a lot of time talking to you at nerd parties, this means you are pretty.)

This concludes the public service announcement.

In addition to the high male-skewed operational sex ratio, we have many things going for us as a community in terms of determinants of successful polyandry. For one thing, our males, I offer, seem to experience less sexual jealousy than average human males. Whether this is mostly a result of their biological characteristics, or mostly a result of cultural norms against jealousy, it does seem to be effective in suppressing most open expression of hostile jealousy. 

Also, we are generally socially broken and pathologically interested in a lot of other things besides social monkey crap. (I mean this as a very high compliment.) We are still monkeys, but we are able to get a lot of our happiness, status, and belonging from sources other than a monogamous pair bond. Since we have often failed to develop healthy social instincts, we are not hampered by these instincts as much as the regular monkeys seem to be.

However, the reason I wrote this is to caution against a stupid, blank-slatey ideal of natural polyamory, and to challenge the community to think harder and create institutions that can make polyandry work and solve its inherent problems. 

The 53 societies Starkweather et al. identified as polyandrous were identified as such based on a marriage-like institution: rights and obligations toward each other and toward any children of the union, along with some degree of limitation of sexual access to others outside the union. Right now, it doesn't look to me like nerd polyamory has almost any institutions or expectations by the community about partners' rights and duties toward each other. Any kind of right or duty is looked at askance; each relationship group is expected to hammer out its own institutions from scratch. 

It's amazing that this is controversial, but I argue that relationship norms are part of our cultural package, and we rely on them both to be secure and to feel secure in our relationships. It's demonstrably not stupid to think that polyandry could be part of our relationship norms; but it is, I think, stupid to think we don't need any norms or institutions at all. 

While we do seem to be low on male sexual jealousy, humans as a species tend to exhibit violent male sexual jealousy; wife-killing is the least culturally variable portion of homicides, and violent sexual jealousy is a frequent motive in male-male homicides as well (see, e.g., Daly & Wilson, Homicide, "The Logic of Same-Sex Conflict"). This represents only the visible tail of jealous violence. While discouragement of jealousy is probably awesome as a sexual norm, I suspect that the outright DENIAL of the existence of jealousy may be harmful. We haven't had a community murder yet that we know of, but what are we doing to make sure it never happens? And what can we do to prevent not just the expression of jealousy, but the painful experience of jealousy? How can we avoid ending up like those people on Proles Behaving Badly?

There are two related problems that may be exacerbated by polyamory: low-status male celibacy and sliminess. While polyandry probably does a better job of managing male intrasexual conflict over females than monogamy in a sex-skewed community, those unfortunate males in the lowest status quadrant are frequently left partnerless; even a Zipgirl membership is a status good when there are 1056 males for every 100 females, and our community is not somehow magically invulnerable to hypergamy. Sliminess is the problem of guys (not just low-status guys) sliming all over women when there aren't clear boundaries preventing such sliminess. I am certain this is a problem in monogamous communities, but I suspect it is even more of a problem when even the "taken" girls are not really "taken." We have not solved this problem as a community, and if anything, it makes us less attractive to much-needed women. Sexual attraction is not egalitarian, and our norms must reflect this. Can we be fair without being egalitarian? Can we make our women happy without making our low-status men miserable? I have rarely seen an acknowledgement that these problems even exist (except from the Men's Rights folks, with whom we have some overlap, like it or not), let alone proposals for how to deal with the problems.

A solution to our skewed sex ratio, perhaps even more powerful than polyandry, is chosen bisexuality (what some call sexuality hacking). Can some men who feel heterosexual but want to be bisexual increase their sexual response to other men? How can they go about doing that? Not much has been written on this. While male sexuality is no doubt less plastic than female sexuality, evidence of highly bisexual societies like the ancient Greeks imply that male sexuality has possibilities unrealized in our present world. Can our community tap these possibilities? 

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